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Abstract 
The parking market is characterized by two types of distortions: crusing and local market power. 
This thesis studies the determinants of parking facilities’ prices in Lisbon using a cross-sectional 
database for facilities in the city, and how this can be influenced by curbside parking fees. The 
results show that operational costs drivers like having for instance a bathroom impact prices the 
most, but local market power and curbside parking density within a 500meters buffer also correlate 
with prices, negatively, as a unitary increase of each leads to a decrease in price of 0.4352% and 
0.0001%, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
Cars usually spend more time parked than moving. A parking space is the origin and destination 
of each journey and finding a space to park can be hard in urban areas. As cities expand car 
ownership and usage and traffic congestion rise, while available space does not, and parking 
becomes a more serious problem for urban residents every day. Lisbon is no exception. According 
to INE, in 2017, there were 506 088 individuals living in the city, owning, approximately, 374 855 
cars. Note that there are still those who live outside of Lisbon but drive to the city to study, work 
or shop, a number estimated to be around 360 000 cars per day. These factors imply an increase in 
demand for parking that is no longer met by the existing supply, since there are only a total of 
204 000 parking spaces (including on- and off-street parking) available.1  
The local government, Camâra Municipal de Lisboa (CML), has already set measures aiming to 
decrease car usage. Such measures include improvements in the public transportation network 
(increasing the number of trains available, renovating metro stations and increasing metro lines), 
creation of Low Emissions Zones, creation of the so called only-pedestrians zones and also building 
cycle lanes. Nonetheless, the result of these measures has not fulfilled the expectations. According 
to INRIX Global Traffic Scoreboard, Lisbon scored higher in 2017 (375 points) than in 2016 (261 
points), showing an increase in urban traffic. 
According to Valleley (1997), there are four mechanisms through which parking supply can be 
affected: control the quantity of different types of parking (number of spaces provided); control the 
                                                             
1 This statistic is based on “Estacionamento em Lisboa”, a study performed by Camâra Municipal de Lisboa in 2010. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain a recent estimate of the total number of commercial parking spaces in the 
city of Lisbon other than the one obtained from the sample used in this thesis. The sample of parking facilities used in 
this thesis has a total of 159 567 parking spaces (71 567 off-street commercial parking spaces and 88 000 paid spaces 
located at the curb). However, there is anecdotal evidence that more cars exist in the city than the number of parking 
spaces available. As such, cruising is a serious problem in the city.  
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location of parking (on- and off-street parking); control access conditions to parking spaces (restrict 
use or not) or control the prices offered (set fees according to desired results). Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to increase supply making use of quantity and location mechanisms, since urban land is a 
limited resource and there are high investment costs, such as land acquisition and construction costs 
for underground facilities (Mingardo et al., 2015). Furthermore, the supply of parking facilities 
(off-street parking) has become a business managed mostly by private firms with local market 
power which in turn culminate in high parking fees. As a result, the solution depends on improving 
how effectively existing facilities set their prices, not only in relation to each other, but also to 
curbside parking fees. Arnott (2006) and Inci and Lindsey (2015) studies of spatial competition 
between parking facilities and curbside parking conclude that setting the right price differential 
between the prices charged by the facilities and the curb can lead to an efficient parking market 
because it eliminates cruising and transfers curbside excessive demand towards parking facilities. 
Note that cruising has high external costs such as traffic congestion as shown by Inci et al. (2015) 
for the case of Istanbul. Moreover, an efficient management of the parking supply is important to 
solve not only congestion, but also parking availability problems and even urban air pollution, 
(Simićević et al., 2012).  
The goal of this thesis is to examine how prices in Lisbon are determined. It considers the 
relationship between the existent pricing scheme and parking facilities features, other facilities 
location, and on-street parking location and fees. It contributes to the existing literature by studying 
the connection of parking facilities and the curb, as its importance has been overlooked for the city 
of Lisbon. Given that the lack of the right price differential leads to an inefficient market, the results 
of this thesis will be relevant to both local authorities and other players in the parking market in 
Lisbon, hopefully shedding some light towards a more effective government intervention. In 
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addition, the analysis includes new variables related to facilities distance from each other (outside 
a catchment area) and type of structure which have not been used in past studies.  
This thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature and main findings. 
Section 3 describes the market characteristics in Lisbon. Section 4 explains the methodology, data 
sources and model. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents the main conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
The behaviour of drivers has been widely researched, starting from the decision of choosing a 
parking location to how price changes impact their behaviour. Teknomo and Hokao (1997) 
concludes that drivers in Surabaya, Indonesia, decide on a parking space based on the existence of 
vacancy spots, trip purpose, cruising time, walking distance from the facility to their destination, 
and price. This information allows for better administrative planning and effective allocation of 
parking spaces to parking demand. Regarding parking in Belgrade, city where off-street parking is 
profoundly insufficient, Simićević, et al. (2012), finds that if facilities prices increase then demand 
decreases, meaning people would change either parking location or method of transport. The study 
also concludes that drivers who cruised for a curbside parking space before looking for a parking 
facility, trying to reduce parking costs, are more sensitive to the price charged by the operator. This 
can have an impact when trying to achieve the right price differential, since as curb fees increase 
to close the gap, the less sensitive drivers are to parking facilities prices, which can help switching 
demand from the curb to parking facilities. 
On the other hand, the market supply and management of parking facilities has not been extensively 
studied, focusing mainly on competition. Froeb et al. (2003), Choné and Linnemer (2012), De Nijs 
(2012) and Lin and Wang (2015), conclude that, because of walking costs, the appropriate market 
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is a small area and that competition affects prices in two ways: decreases the price level and 
increases price discrimination in relation to parking duration. 
Froeb et al. (2003), Choné and Linnemer (2012) and De Nijs (2012) analyse the impact that mergers 
in the parking facilities market have on parking fees. Froeb et al. (2003) simulate the impact on 
prices for a merger where the participants are constrained by their capacity. By comparing capacity 
constrained firms in two different settings (merging and not merging), it concludes that the effect 
on price from a merger is weakened when capacity is a binding constraint, as firms safeguard 
against share-stealing quantity responses. For the city of Paris, Choné and Linnemer (2012) claim 
that Vinci buying GTM was followed by a 3% increase in public facilities price and De Nijs (2012), 
building on this work, concludes that the overall level of competition decreased leading to a 5% 
increase in price as well as more price discrimination, as more significant discounts were offered. 
In both studies, pricing schemes for 12 hours offered by the operators, previously and after 
merging, are analysed. However, parking facilities also compete with the curb, and this relation 
was not accounted for in these studies. 
Lin and Wang (2015) and Gragera and Albalate (2016) study price determinants for parking 
facilities.  
Lin and Wang (2015) study the Manhattan’s parking facilities market, particularly the connection 
between competition and price discrimination, and concludes that the curvature degree of hourly 
pricing schemes decreases with competition, meaning a greater proportional drop in low-end prices 
than in high-end prices. Assuming the presence of walking costs, define the appropriate market as 
a limited area with a 0.3- or 0.5-mile radius, and use 602 facilities and the 1hour fee to estimate a 
price equation. To relate variables, namely features of the surrounding neighbourhood and 
competition measures, with prices, it proposes a log-linear relationship.  
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The main conclusion is that the overall price level is negatively related to competition, in particular, 
a unitary decrease in the HHI (that translates to an increase in competition) leads to a 95% price 
reduction, whereas a unitary increase in the owned share of competitors (meaning a decrease in 
competition) leads to a 53% price increase. Furthermore, they study the curvature of pricing 
schemes in relation to parking duration. It concludes that as competition accentuates, price 
discrimination decreases, meaning a sharper decline in prices for drivers parking for shorter periods 
of time compared to those with longer parking duration. It justifies these results with the different 
behaviour of drivers when cruising for a parking space, assuming the second will undergo a more 
thorough search and be more sensitive to price. These are in line with the current textbook theory 
by stressing that a firm’s capacity to price discriminate is undermined by competition. Moreover, 
this paper concludes further that an efficient parking policy should incorporate local parking 
conditions, and so, it justifies the use of fixed effects accounting for parking facilities location, 
although this was not done in this paper. 
Gragera and Albalate (2016) investigate price determinants for the Barcelona’s market featuring 
the interaction of curbside parking availability with demand for parking facilities. It is concluded 
that these are not perfect substitutes as drivers prefer on-street parking, being willing to pay a 
premium for it. Kobus et al. (2013) reaches the same conclusion regarding parking in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, Gragera and Albalate (2016) also find that curbside regulation highly 
affects demand for parking facilities. By setting a 500-meters radius to define their relevant area, 
also due to walking costs, and using 391 facilities and the 1hour fee; they estimate the model by 
considering parking, facilities features illustrating operational costs and neighbourhood 
characteristics, competition measures, and curbside parking information, such as spaces available 
and prices charged.  
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Their results show that, in Barcelona, parking facilities prices are negatively correlated to on-street 
fees, as a €1/hour decrease in curbfees leads to an 11.5% price increase, showcasing the 
uneconomical and ineffective usage given to curbside parking. This argument is very relevant: 
curbside parking fees are being set too low, as authorities neglect that parking facilities and 
curbside parking are substitutes, even if not perfect, increasing cruising. Lower prices for on-street 
parking are associated with increased traffic levels in areas where the demand is high, (Shoup, 
2016). In this case, the curb is being favoured over a facility, allowing the operators to expand their 
market power, deepening the distortion present. Furthermore, they claim that while curbside 
parking supply has no statistical significant, its level of scarcity has: the dominance of the facility 
over the curb leads, for each additional curbside space, to a price increase of 0.002%. According 
to their results, market concentration is not statistically significant, but the share of facilities owned 
by the same operator within its catchment area positively correlates with prices, since a 1% unitary 
increase in this share drives prices up by 0.57%. This makes sense, as the operator gains market 
power, it is able to increase prices. 
Moreover, the authors claim that price variation is mostly due to operational costs and quality 
drivers, as for example, facilities with sophisticated technological payment systems charge 5.61% 
more. These differences can inform operators on marginal costs’ heterogeneity and how to 
accommodate government intervention, such as the opening of more public facilities to increase 
competition and decrease off-street prices. Their final statement stresses the effects of imperfect 
information, specially how it limits the effectiveness of direct price regulation and public actions. 
For example, if drivers are unfamiliar with the price distributions being offered or alternative 
facilities in the area, parking facilities can once again increase their mark-up, worsening pre-
existing distortions.  
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Lin and Wang (2015) and Gragera and Albalate (2016), more closely the latter, are the starting 
point for this thesis, namely for the use of a catchment area for the parking facilities, the variables 
and specification used in the model. This thesis will also account for new variables that incorporate 
location and the different types of parking facilities, expanding the existing analyses. 
3. Parking market in Lisbon 
This thesis focuses on the parking facilities market in the city of Lisbon where the main activity 
is off-street parking and the product, a parking facility, refers to a specific location for short- or 
long-term parking. According to the Portuguese Government’s regulation (Deliberação n.º 
41/AM/2004), parking facilities can be classified into three types: A, B and C, meaning 
respectively: parks that serve big commercial surfaces and public rotation, parks for residents only, 
and mixed parks for both public rotation and residents. The facilities can be on the surface, 
underground or structural, with different capacities and offer different features.  
Our sample for the city of Lisbon includes 237 commercial parking facilities available for public 
access, owned by 92 companies, some with restricted use. From the existing companies, only five 
are public operators, being EMEL the one with the largest market share of 58 parks; there are eight 
multinational and national private parking operators such as Empark, SABA and Placegar with 71 
parks combined; and the remaining 104 parks belong to private individual companies (usually one 
facility by company) with their primary market varying from hotels, shopping malls, universities 
and supermarkets. 
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Table 1: Description of parking facilities ownership 
 
This industry is somehow regulated by the government, as in Deliberação n.º 41/AM/2004. 
However it does not create significant barriers to entry. 
This market can be analysed using either the number of facilities owned or the total parking 
capacity of each operator. Note that not always a higher number of facilities owned by one 
individual company translates into a higher number of parking spaces. Regarding individual 
companies and their respective market share, EMEL and Empark are the largest firms under both 
measure definitions as seen in table 2 where the Top 4 biggest players are shown.  
 
Table 2 – Biggest players present in the market 
 
Total Market Share
Number of facilities owned
EMEL 58 24.37%
EMPARK 39 16.37%
Pingo Doce, SA 14 5.88%
Placegar 11 4.62%
Parking capacity owned
EMPARK 12922 18.06%
EMEL 9525 13.31%
SIERRA 9414 13.15%
SIENT 5149 7.19%
Biggest Players
State - Owned 63 Private Companies 104
EMEL 58 Airports 6
Municipalities 2 Auditoriums 5
State Facilities 3 Garages 16
Private Operators 71 Hospitals 10
APARC 2 Hotels 25
Braga Parques 3 Real Estate 6
Empark 39 Shopping Malls 11
Mundicenter 2 Supermarkets 17
Placegar 11 Universities 2
SABA 4 Others 6
SIENT 8
SIERRA 2 Total 237
Parking Facilities Ownership
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The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and concentration ratios are widely used to measure 
concentration levels. In Lisbon, parking facilities operate in an overall competitive market, as 
presented in table 3, by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index being less than 0.15, as this represents 
the accepted threshold in the economic theory for a competitive market. As to concentration, 
considering the market share for the 4 and 8 largest companies shown in table 4, this market can 
be recognized as relatively concentrated, likely an oligopoly, as the ratios are higher than 40%, 
again, being this the accepted threshold in the economic competition theory. 
  
Table 3 – HHI for the parking market  Table 4 – Concentration ratios for the marking market 
 
It can then be concluded that the overall Lisbon parking market is characterized by large firms 
operating in a competitive market. However, it should be noted that the relevant market for a 
parking facility tends to be a much smaller area than the city level or even a civil parish level. The 
reason for this is related to the existence of walking costs. Drivers are not willing to search for 
parking alternatives far away from their final destination. Therefore, evaluating the type of market 
structure by focusing on the HHI and concentration ratios for the whole city of Lisbon can be 
misguided. On the other hand, when taking into account the previous features when defining the 
relevant market for a parking facility, one concludes that there is evidence of an oligopoly type of 
competition, and in some situations, even a monopoly or at least a dominant firm. Moreover, the 
average HHI per parking facility catchment area, a buffer with 500 meters radius, is 0.375. 
Number of facilities owned
CR4 51,3%
CR8 60,1%
Parking capacity owned
CR4 51,7%
CR8 69,8%
Concentration ratios
Number of facilities owned   0.09621
Parking capacity owned   0.08483
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
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According to the existing economic theory, a HHI above 0.25 is a highly concentrated market, and 
so, at a local level parking facilities can have market power. 
Interestingly, EMEL parking facilities have oligopolies in most of its locations and several 
monopolies, possibly due to a first mover advantage: initially, being the only operator in the market 
allow it to be established in key areas of the city, which together with the current barriers to entry, 
makes it difficult for other operators to open new facilities where EMEL is already a dominant 
firm. 
Price is an instrument that affects the individual’s decision of using a car by increasing its cost, and 
can also influence parking spaces’ usage (e.g. enhance public rotation) and impact the different 
types of users (e.g. favor residents with designated spaces or different pricing schemes, such as 
monthly passes).  
Price can be charged as a flat fee or it can be discriminated (a progressive fee, for example, as 
drivers have different willingness to pay or even to discourage long-term parking, in the case of 
curbside parking). Additionally, prices can be discriminated by type of user. In Lisbon, the price 
charged by parking facilities for one hour varies between 0.0€ and 3.6€, the average being 1.21€. 
It should be noted that the same operator can charge different prices in different facilities, either 
due to the competition in that area or the different features offered at a specific location. Although 
there are public-owned operators (EMEL, municipalities and different public-owned facilities), the 
prices for the facilities they manage still react to market forces and are not regulated or fixed by 
the government. Prices can also differ according to the type of facility and location. 
The presence of alternative parking options can also influence prices and, in the parking facilities 
market the main substitute is curbside parking. Curbside parking is controlled only by EMEL, 
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which sets fixed prices at a uniform hourly rate, contrasting with those set by parking facilities, and 
vary only according to the city zone, as described in table 5, which can be: Green, mostly for 
residential areas and far away from the city centre; Yellow, for transaction areas between green 
and red; or Red, mostly for commercial and service areas, in the city centre, served by a good 
network of public transportation and for a maximum of two hours. 
 
Table 5 – Curbside parking fees in Lisbon, per zone 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. The  Model 
In order to investigate the determinants of parking fees, a price equation for the first hour was 
estimated. It is hypothesized that price (𝑝𝑖) set by each parking facility can be explained as function 
of its own features (𝑜𝑖), the surrounding market structure characteristics (𝑚𝑖), the curbside parking 
conditions (𝑐𝑖), civil parish specific characteristics, captured through special fixed effects (𝑠𝑖), and 
idiosyncratic error term (𝜀𝑖), within a buffer with D radius, being this the relevant market area 
around each parking facility.  
This estimation will follow the Ordinary Least Squares method, using robust standard errors to 
control for possible heteroskedasticity. Lin and Wang (2015) show that, in relation to parking 
duration, total parking expense is an increasing concave function, as such, price does not behave 
in a linear form. For that reason, and following the existent literature, a Log-Linear form is used 
when estimating the model. Spatial fixed effects at the civil parish level are also incorporated in 
the specification to account for possible unobserved variables, eliminating the omitted variable 
0h15 1h00 2h00 4h00
Green Zone 0.25€ 0.80€ 1.60€ 3.20€
Yellow Zone 0.30€ 1.20€ 2.40€ 4.80€
Red Zone 0.50€ 1.60€ 3.20€ –
Pricing Scheme for curbside parking
15 
 
bias, with the case reference being the civil parish of Ajuda. Moreover, fixed effects are also 
included for the type of structure that the facility, with the case reference being structural parking.  
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑜𝑖; 𝑚𝑖; 𝑐𝑖; 𝑎𝑖; 𝜀𝑖)                                              (1) 
ln( 𝑝𝑖) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                 (2) 
where,  
𝑜𝑖 = matrix of parking facilities features (capacity, operating hours, type of structure, operational 
costs and quality drivers) 
𝑚𝑖 = matrix of market structure characteristics (HHI, ownership share) 
𝑐𝑖 = matrix of curbside parking conditions (parking spaces, zones and fees) 
𝑠𝑖 = civil parishes specific characteristics 
𝜀𝑖 = idiosyncratic error term 
 
4.2. Data Sources 
For this thesis, primary research was conducted regarding parking facilities features and prices, 
focusing on both private and public commercial parks located throughout Lisbon. Each facility was 
geo-coded through a georeferencing program, QGIS, in order to draw pinpointed maps and create 
competition variables, useful in the study of market structure, competition and impact of facilities 
location on prices. The map originated with this program is shown in figure 1, indicating each 
facility location.  
 
Regarding curbside parking, EMEL is the only responsible operator, therefore, data relating to 
spaces density and prices was collected from their website. 
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All additional data presented in this study was collected from official records and government 
official websites, namely, INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística) where data on population, car 
ownership rates, house selling prices was obtained; and Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, where data 
on civil parishes, such as area was retrieved, and also data on commercial and cultural spaces, 
transit options, and parking meters through Lisboa Aberta, an open data source website provided 
by the municipality. 
 
Figure 1 – Map for the parking facilities analysed in this thesis 
4.3. Variables 
To estimate the price charged by parking facilities, measures representing the facilities features, 
measures accounting for market structure and measures related to curbside parking were used as 
explanatory variables. These variables will now be presented, and their expected impact discussed. 
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The three main characteristics used to account for operational and development costs are the facility 
capacity, the facility opening hours and the value of the land were the facility is located.  
CAPACITY is the total number of parking spaces of each facility. This variable represents the 
pertinent investment costs incurred and demonstrates the shortage of the supply with respect to 
potential demand. The latter is also relevant when studying price determination, since the greater 
the gap between potential demand and available capacity, the stronger the power parking facilities 
can exercise. As such, the possible impact on prices is unpredictable.  
HSPRC is the housing average selling price, in euros, per square meter, for the civil parish the 
facility is located in. This works as a surrogate for land value and is incorporated to reflect 
investment costs variability related with land acquisition.  
Although CAPACITY and HSPRC are variables used to illustrate investment costs, they represent 
different perspectives of it, thus having a low correlation value (-0.04). 
OHW is the number of opening hours, per week, for each facility. This allows consideration of 
operating costs (e.g. electricity) and personnel costs and is expected to have a positive relation to 
prices. 
Moreover, through dummy variables, other features that might have an influence on prices were 
also taken into account: parking facility structure (surface, underground or structural); payment 
options (cash, card or Via Verde); if it has restrictions (height or GPL); if it has specific features 
(disabled spots, gated, light, overnight option, security camera, elevator or bathroom); and if it 
offers additional services (manned, car wash, valet). It is anticipated that some of these will impact 
prices, as they might increase investment and operating costs, decrease personnel costs or even 
affect drivers perceived quality. 
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COMDENSE accounts for the commercial density present in the relevant area. It is calculated as 
the total number of commercial places divided by the area, in hectares, within the buffer market. 
As the level of commercial density increases, price increase is also predictable, considering areas 
with a higher economic level have a higher parking demand.  
Regarding, market structure, two aspects were covered for each parking facility in its relevant area: 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the presence of competitors owned by the same operator. 
Following the existing literature, to create the significant market for each parking facility a 500 
meters radius buffer was used, due to the aforementioned walking costs. 
HHI was calculated as the sum of the squared market share that each operator has within the 
pertinent area for a specific facility. This value ranges between 0 and 1, with the latter case 
representing a monopoly situation. It is expected to have a negative impact on prices since an 
increase in competition translates into price decrease. 
SHARE was incorporated to assess the impact that the level of market power of each facility has 
on price. This was calculated as the share of competitors owned by the home operator within the 
relevant area, and varies between 0 and 1, where 1 represents the operator owning 100% of the 
parking facilities present in that confined area. Contrary to HHI, it is anticipated to have a positive 
relation on prices, because an increase in market power allows the operator to increase prices. 
Following Albalate and Gragera (2016), to take into consideration the effect that curbside parking 
can have as a substitute for off-street parking facilities, the features of on-street parking were also 
included in this thesis through three explanatory variables. 
CURBDENSE expresses the level of supply for curbside parking for the catchment market area, 
measured in spaces per hectare. To calculate this measure, the total number of existent curbside 
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spaces within the relevant area was divided by the buffer area, in hectares. It is expected to 
negatively influence prices, considering these spaces are a strong substitute for parking facilities. 
CURBFEE is the weighted curbside price per hour of the curbside spaces existent in the relevant 
area, by the type of zone. Its predicted to have a positive relation with the prices set by the operators.  
GRATIO is the ratio of the capacity of the home parking facility to the curbside spaces existent in 
the relevant market, allowing to measure the power of facilities over the curb. It is expected to have 
a positive impact on prices, as the stronger the power the facility has in relation to the curb, the 
higher the prices it can charge. 
EMEL is a dummy variable with the purpose of accounting for the fact that some parking facilities 
are owned by the public operator. Even though the prices charged in these facilities follow an 
economic reasoning and are not fixed by the government, they were the first movers in this market. 
OPTIONS comprehends other type of options for drivers to reach their destination - the number 
of metro and train stations within the significant pertinent area for each parking facility, as they 
can substitute the transportation mode altogether and not just the parking space. 
Adding to the existent literature, this thesis proposes variables that relate distance between parking 
facilities with type of structure, to assess how prices from more distant facilities (outside the 
catchment area), which imply higher walking costs, impact the parking facility pricing scheme. 
This effect was studied having into account different types of structure of parking facilities, as these 
imply different cost structures. Besides the 500 metres buffer considered, it were also included 
“donuts” for intervals between 500 and 600 metres, 600 and 700 metres, and 700 and 800 metres. 
These variables were created through QGIS, and calculated as the average price per type of 
structure for each “donut” interval.  
Table 6 characterizes the variables mentioned, except for the dummy variables.   
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Table 6 – Summary of descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. Dummy variables 
are not included. 
 
It should also be mentioned that before running the OLS model, the Gauss-Markov Assumptions 
were tested to ensure that the OLS results were the best possible estimate. The assumptions on 
random sampling and parameters’ linearity are automatically checked. The no perfect collinearity 
assumption was tested through VIF, where no variable presented a value higher than 10 and where 
the mean VIF was 2.01 (please refer to Appendix 1). The assumption for zero conditional mean 
tested through a scatter plot of the errors was not satisfied, possibly due to the omitted variable 
bias, and so, to account for this, fixed effects regarding civil parishes were used. The last 
assumption, homoskedasticity, verified by the Breusch-Pagan Test, was also not satisfied, thus, 
robust standard errors were used, to control for the existing heteroskedasticity.   
5. Results and Discussion 
The model estimation results are presented in table 72. Model 2 accounts for the fixed effects 
that arise from each civil parish and is the best model as it presents a higher adjusted R-squared. 
This model explains 29.8% of the parking price variation observed in Lisbon3.  
 
                                                             
2 Model estimations were done through Stata. 
3 It is interesting to note that the adjusted R-squared in this analysis is of the same magnitude as in Albalate and Gragera 
(2016) which equals 0.283. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Unit Description
PRICE 237 1.21 0.05 0 3.60 price per hour 1h  price
LNPRICE 237 0.19 0.03 -2.48 1.28 natural log of price per hor 1h  price
CAPACITY 237 301.97 36.21 1 6850 number of spaces capacity
OHW 237 148.90 2.16 50 168 number of hours per week operating hours per week
HHI 237 0.38 0.02 0.06 1 index points Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
SHARE 237 0.18 0.02 0 1 percentage share of competitors owned by operator 
COMDENSE 237 368.10 20.83 0 1639 density per hectare commercial density
HSPRC 237 3082.48 38.65 1606 4133 price per squared meter house average selling price
OPTIONS 237 1.20 0.06 0 4 number of options train and metro options
CURBDENSE 237 2277.42 105.21 0 5551.32 density per hectare curbside parking density
GRATIO 237 45.47 18.66 0 3693 number of spaces ratio between facilities and curb capacity
CURBFEE 237 0.87 0.03 0 1.48 price per hour curbside parking fees
PSURF500 237 0.77 0.05 0 3 price per hour average price surface facilities within 500m
PUNDER500 237 1.21 0.05 0 3.40 price per hour average price underground facilities within 500m
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Table 7 – Results.  
*, ** and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Area-specific dummies are not reported. 
Note that including civil parish fixed effects improved the model performance, and so, conclusions 
will be drawn from Model 2. However, these spatial fixed effects might not accurately capture the 
unobserved variation of the parking facility relevant market, as this tends to be a smaller catchment 
area than a civil parish.  
The fixed effects accounting for the type of structure show that being an underground parking 
facility (UNDER), rather than a structural one, is not statistically significant. 
The different operational cost measures used have different impacts on prices. While offering the 
overnight option (ONIGH) and having the presence of a bathroom (BATH) translates into an 
increase of the price charged by 22.9% e 16.3%, respectively, the operating hours (SQOHW) are 
not statistically significant. The possibility to pay with Via Verde (PVIA) increases the price 
Coeficient P-value Coeficient P-value
SURF .992224 0.413 .033757 0.818
UNDER .2157866 0.091* .1947019 0.186
SQOHW -.0000103 0.030** -8.48e-06 0.142
ONIGHT .2210608 0.064* .2294376 0.082*
BATH .184122 0.012** .1627641 0.040**
PVIA .1962799 0.056* .1877056 0.082*
HSPRC .000098 0.201 -.0001519 0.704
COMDENSE .043305 0.000*** .0472814 0.002***
HHI -.3194704 0.095* -.43519 0.048**
SQSHARE .4328218 0.060* .314689 0.234
CURBFEE -.1664895 0.268 .1481164 0.282
CURBDENSE -.0000285 0.099* -.0000978 0.032**
EMEL -.0597056 0.579 -.0332237 0.758
OPTIONS -.0089447 0.776 -.0406117 0.275
PSURF500 .1146196 0.052* .0364976 0.657
PUNDER500 -.0645652 0.355 -.1275623 0.033**
Constant -.1878485 0.436 .5773285 0.574
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Structure fixed effects
Civil parish fixed effects No
237
0.298
Yes
Yes
Model 1 Model 2
Variables
237
0.247
Yes
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charged by 18.8%, ceteris paribus. The existence of such system implies not only increased 
installation costs but also increased perceived quality, and so parking facilities can charge a mark-
up on their fee. 
HSPRC, which attempts to capture land value and subsequent costs, is not statistically significant.  
COMDENSE correlates positively to prices and is the most significant explanatory variable. It 
expresses the possible parking demand present within the relevant area, since high levels of 
economic activity create demand for parking in that area. Ceteris paribus, a unitary increase in 
commercial density per hectare leads to a 4.73% price increase.  
Contrary to the parking facilities market in Barcelona, HHI is significant in the Lisbon’s market, 
similarly to Lin and Wang (2015) results for the Manhattan’s market. However these have opposite 
correlations: while in Lisbon, an index point unitary increase in the HHI decreases prices in 43.5%, 
ceteris paribus, in Manhattan a 4% decrease in the HHI (which corresponds to 1 standard deviation 
of their data) leads to a 12% price decrease.  In Barcelona, Gragera and Albalate (2016) justify 
their result by the fact that imperfect information gives parking facilities no incentives to lower 
prices, as drivers would not be aware of prices changes or alternative parking facilities nearby, and 
so, parking facilities competition with each other, is not a significant variable. In Manhattan, 
competition drives prices down, as predicted by the economic theory. In Lisbon, this does not seem 
to be the case. A possible reason for this negative relation can be that the parking facilities 
catchment area characteristics have a strong influence on how these facilities set their prices, 
especially curb prices. Note that competing with curbside parking is more relevant than competing 
with each other, as the price differential between the two is low. So, even if the market has increased 
concentration from parking facilities, these will still react to on-street parking fees.  
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In addition, and also in contrast to Gragera and Albalate (2016) findings, CURBFEE is not 
statistically significant, but CURBDENSE is. This may be explained by the price differential 
between the curb and parking facilities being smaller in Lisbon (average price differential of €0.34), 
than in Barcelona (€0.72), and the availability of parking spaces being also an important driver of 
parking prices, although the impact of the latter may be overlooked, as a unitary increase in 
curbside parking density decreases prices in 0.0001%. 
EMEL is not statistically relevant. Even though the parking facility is owned by the public operator, 
it behaves as a private operator and so this characteristic has no significant impact on how prices 
are set. OPTIONS is also not statistically significant.  
The price for surface parking facilities within 500m (PSURF500) is not significant. However, price 
for underground parking facilities within 500m (PUNDER500) is. A unitary increase in this price 
will decrease the price estimation in 12.8%, ceteris paribus. 
6. Conclusions 
Lisbon, like most cities in the world, has a pricing gap between parking facilities and curbside 
parking. This leads to inefficiencies in the parking market due to cruising and traffic congestion 
(Shoup, 2016). The right price differential occurs when curb fees are close to parking facilities 
prices, allowing for rotation. In Lisbon, this differential is €0.34, nonetheless, not small enough to 
achieve efficiency. 
In this thesis, the determinants of parking prices were studied, accounting for operational costs and 
quality forces as well as market structure characteristics, curbside parking features and by 
incorporating distance related variables. A Log-Linear specification was used to estimate the price 
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model using a cross-sectional database of 237 parking facilities located throughout the city of 
Lisbon.  
As in Gragera and Albalate (2016) curbside features also influence the price charged by parking 
facilities in Lisbon and, like in the Barcelona case, curbside parking is also being used inefficiently. 
However, the gap between curb fees and the prices set by off-street commercial facilities is not as 
high in Lisbon compared to Barcelona, and therefore parking facilities cannot exploit their market 
power with the same strength as in the Barcelona case. This may explain why curb fees are not 
statistically significant in the Lisbon’s market and why parking facilities charge, on average, lower 
prices compared to Barcelona. On the other hand, curbside parking density is significant and should 
be used as a policy instrument to overcome some of the parking issues and car usage in Lisbon.  
Furthermore, and in line with the existent literature, variables that account for operational costs and 
quality drivers have the highest impact on parking prices, explaining most of the price variation in 
Lisbon’s parking facilities market.  
To get the right price differential that allows the elimination of cruising and the problems that arise 
with it, curb prices should be higher. This would in turn reduce the gap between the curb and off-
street facilities prices and also cruising as shown in the Amsterdam case. However, some caution 
should be taken when considering the main conclusions from this study. Like in the case of 
Barcelona, it is possible that Lisbon drivers also do not have perfect information on the prices 
charged by parking facilities or about the location of neighbouring parking facilities. Parking 
facilities can take advantage of this and further exacerbate pre-existing distortions by exploiting 
their market power, even if the gap between curb fees and off-street prices is quite slim. 
Nonetheless, future research relating driver’s information and behaviour could be taken to further 
underhand parking prices. Another avenue for future research would be to explore possible spatial 
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interactions between existing parking facilities which if not address may lead to spatial 
autocorrelation.  
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Appendix 
 
Table demonstrating VIFs results for the variables included in the model. 
 
 
 Variable VIF
PRICE 1.62
SURF 2.36
UNDER 2.87
CAPACITY 1.16
OHW 1.66
PVIA 1.67
ONIGHT 1.75
BATH 1.47
COMDENSE 2.36
HSPRC 2.08
HHI 2.72
SHARE 2.34
EMEL 2.00
CURBDENSE 2.01
GRATIO 1.08
CURBFEE 4.12
OPTIONS 1.69
PSURF500 1.37
PUNDER500 1.82
Mean VIF 2.01
